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MANAGED CARE REGULATION: CAN WE LEARN
FROM OTHERS? THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost*
Because the United States relies on private insurance for financing health care to
a much greater degree than do other nations, and because managed care as a form
of private insurance is further developed in the United States than elsewhere, it is
arguable that we have little to learn from other nations about managed care regu-
lation. This Article tests this hypothesis with respect to Chile, a country where
private insurance is widespread and managed care is emerging. It concludes that
by studying the experience of other nations we might gain a larger perspective on
the context of our concerns in regulating managed care, in particular appraising
more soberly the difficulties we face in regulating private health insurance mar-
kets; understand more fully the importance of attempting the difficult task of
regulation; and appreciate more completely our responsibility for sharing with the
rest of the world our insights into managed care regulation. We may even find
regulatory tools that others have created that might help us with our tasks.
INTRODUCTION
What lessons can we in the United States learn from other na-
tions about how to regulate managed care? At first glance it would
appear that there is relatively little to learn. The United States' sys-
tem of health care finance is so idiosyncratic that the rich
experience of other nations in designing health care systems is
largely inaccessible to us.
To begin, a nation cannot have regulation unless it has a private
sector to regulate. A government manages a national health insur-
ance program; one does not regulate it. While virtually every
country in the world has a private health insurance industry, in
most places private health insurance plays a very different role than
it does in the United States.' In countries with universal public
* Visiting Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Spring 2000;
Newton D. Baker, Baker & Hostetler Chair, College of Law, and Professor, College of Medi-
cine and Public Health, The Ohio State University. J.D. 1975, University of Chicago Law
School. The information provided in this Article regarding the Chilean health care system
was current at the time of the Symposium in the fall of 1998.
1. See DeborahJ. Chollet & Maureen Lewis, Private Health Insurance: Principles and Practice,
in INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK CONFERENCE,
MARCH 10-11, 1997, at 77, 104-09 tbls.1-2 (George J. Schieber ed., World Bank Discussion
Paper No. 365, 1997) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING] (describing the
role of private health insurance in 10 OECD and 36 non-OECD countries).
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health services (the Beveridge model) ,2 persons who purchase pri-
vate health insurance do so in order to obtain health services more
quickly and conveniently, in more pleasant settings, or from more
prestigious professionals than is possible under the public system to
which they also have access.3 In the United Kingdom, for example,
persons rely on private insurance normally to permit queuejumping
for certain kinds of surgery,4 while in Australia private insurance pays
for hospital care in private facilities. In some countries with social
health insurance systems (the Bismark model) 6 on the other hand,
private health insurance is limited to persons, usually with high in-
comes, who are not legally obligated to participate in the national
social insurance program.7 This is the situation, for example, in
Germany and the Netherlands.8 Finally, in a few countries, such as
Canada, private health insurance is only permitted to cover services
excluded from coverage under the national health insurance
scheme. 9 In only a handful of countries other than the United
States-South Africa, South Korea, and several Latin American
countries-is private health insurance extensively relied on by the
general population as a primary source of payment for basic health
care services. 10
2. The 1942 Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services laid out the
model for what became the British National Health Service. Under the Beveridge national
health service model, health care is funded by general taxation, and services are directly
available to patients generally free at point of service. SeeJUDITH ALLSOP, HEALTH POLICY
AND THE NHS, TOWARDS 2000, at 24-25 (2d ed. 1995).
3. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 79.
4. See ALLSOP, supra note 2, at 163-64.
5. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 79.
6. Chancellor Bismark is credited with the creation of the German social insurance
system in the 1880s. See RICHARD KNOX, GERMANY'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ONE NATION,
UNITED WITH HEALTH CARE FOP ALL 26-27 (1993). Under the German system, health care
is funded through social insurance funds that are financed through mandatory wage-based
premiums and used to pay health care providers for services provided their members. See id.
at 53-58.
7. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 79.
8. See I FINANCING HEALTH CARE 427-28, 718-19 (Ullrich K. Hoffmeyer & Thomas R.
McCarthy eds., 1994).
9. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 104.
10. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 104-08. Since 1989, most Koreans have been
required by law to purchase health insurance, which some describe as private insurance, see
id. at 92, though the insurers resemble the sickness funds of central Europe. See Bong-Min
Yang, Health Insurance in Korea: Opportunities and Challenges, HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN., June
1991, at 119; BongMin Yang, The Role of Health Insurance in the Growth of the Private Health
Sector in Korea, 11 INT'LJ. HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. 231, 246 (1996); Seung-Hum Yu & Ger-
ard F. Anderson, Achieving Universal Health Insurance in Korea: A Model for Other Developing
Countries?, 20 HEALTH POL'Y 289, 290 (1992). In South Africa, 16% of the population is
covered by private insurance, including 69% of the white and 7% of the black population.
See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 108. A national health insurance program is being de-
veloped in South Africa under the Constitution. See Department of Health, White Paper for the
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Managed care also is not well developed outside of the United
States. The concept of managed care is notoriously difficult to de-
fine.' One could argue that the high degree of involvement of
government payers (usually at the municipal level) in managing
the provision of care in the Scandinavian countries resembles the
integration of financing and provision functions characteristic of
managed care.12 Some countries with social insurance schemes, no-
tably Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands, have also begun
to experiment with managed care arrangements that more closely
resemble those common in the United States.13 Nowhere else in
the world, however, can be found the combination of widespread
private insurance and vigorous managed care arrangements that
characterize the United States.
This is not to say, however, that we are totally alone on this
planet as we try to determine how the government should respond
to managed care. Other countries do have private health insur-
ance, and most of these nations are attempting to regulate it.
Throughout much of the world, moreover, there is in fact interest
in managed care arrangements, both because these arrangements
are perceived as having been successful in containing the growth of
Transformation of the Health System in South Africa (last modified Mar. 23, 1999)
<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/whitepapers/health.html> (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Michael A. Simpson, Reforming Health Care in South Africa, in
REFORMING HEALTH CARE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REFORM 101, 111-17 (David Seedhouse ed., 1995) (describing the ANC National Health
Plan and the Pan-Africanist Congress health policy, developed during the 1994 democratic
elections). In other African countries, particularly former British colonies, private health
insurance exists, but few can afford it. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 92. Latin Ameri-
can countries, particularly Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia, are developing
pluralistic models that resemble the Chilean model discussed in this Article. See Andr6 C.
Medici et al., Managed Care and Managed Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean, in
INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING supra note 1, at 215, 218; Karen Stocker et al., The
Exportation of Managed Care to Latin America, 340 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1131, 1133-34 (1999).
11. See generally Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A
Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75
(1993) (providing one of the most successful efforts to describe and classify managed care
arrangements).
12. See generally Mats Brommels, Contracting and Political Boards in Planned Markets, in
IMPLEMENTING PLANNED MARKETS IN HEALTH CARE: BALANCING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RESPONSIBILITY 86 (Richard B. Saltman & Casten Von Otter eds., 1995) (describing Scandi-
navian health care organization).
13. See generally Timothy Jost, Report from the Field: German Health Care Reform: The Next
Steps, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 697 (1998); Dominik Graf von Stillfried, Schweizer Ge-
sundheitsreform: Vorbildfiir Deutschland?, 8 DIE ERSATZKASSE 277 (1996). While these nations
have followed United States developments in managed care and managed competition with
interest, and their health care reforms in some respects resemble United States models,
their reforms are based very much on their own distinctive ideologies and histories. See Law-
rence D. Brown, Exceptionalism as the Rule? US. Health Policy Innovation and Cross-National
Learning, 23J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 35 passim (1998).
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health care costs in the United States and because they are being
aggressively marketed throughout the world by persons from the
United States. 14 Other countries are at least beginning to think
about how to regulate managed care if and when it arrives. There
may be lessons to learn, therefore, if we look beyond our borders.
If we choose to look beyond our borders, the most productive
direction to look is south. In South America private health insur-
ance is becoming increasingly common. 5 One of the most useful
South American countries to consider is Chile. Chile is perhaps the
only nation in the world whose constitution guarantees its resi-
dents a right to purchase private health insurance. Article 19, No. 9
of the 1980 Chilean Constitution provides:
The Right to Health Protection
The State protects free and equal access to actions for the
promotion, protection, and recovery of health and for reha-
bilitation of the individual.
The coordination and control of the activities related to
health shall also rest with the State. A primary duty of the
State is to guarantee the execution of health activities,
whether provided by public or private institutions, in the
manner and under the conditions established by law, which
may provide for mandatory payments.
Each person shall have the right to choose the health system,
whether State or private, that he wishes to join.16
This right is by no means merely theoretical. Currently 3.8 mil-
lion persons, about 26% of the Chilean population, and 32% of
the workforce, are privately insured by thirty-three Chilean
ISAPREs (Instituciones de Salud Previsional), private health insur-
14. See Jost, supra note 13, at 705-09; see also JOHANN BEHRENS ET AL., GESUNDHEIT-
SSYSTEMENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND DEUTSCHLAND: WETTBEWERB UND MARKT ALS
ORDNUNGSELEMENTE IM GESUNDHEITSWESEN AUF DEM PRUFSTAND DES SYSTEMVERGLEICHS
(1996) (exploring what in the United States experience might be useful to Germany and
vice versa).
15. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 96-97, 106-09; see also Medici et al., supra note
10, at 215.
16. Raill Bertelsen Repetto, Chile, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS: A Com-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY 166, 172 (Her-nn L. Fuenzalida-Puelma & Susan Scholle
Connor eds., Pan American Health Organization Scientific Publication No. 509, 1989).
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ance companies. 7 In 1995, 42% of total Chilean health expendi-
tures of U.S.$2.653 billion came from the private sector."i The
ISAPREs are not managed care organizations. Some of them have
for some time owned their own health care institutions, however,
or have had preferred provider arrangements with doctors.' 9 At
least two ISAPREs, moreover, have recently begun to develop man-
aged care plans that resemble more closely health maintenance
organizations or point of service plans in the United States. °
The ISAPREs have been supervised since 1991 by the Superin-
tendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional (SISP), an active
and aggressive regulatory agency. The SISP both develops norms
for the private health insurance industry and actively supervises
compliance with these norms.2 It also, as is described below, serves
as an arbitrator when beneficiaries come into conflict with their
insurers.22
This Article is about regulation of private health insurance in
Chile-about the ISAPREs and the SISP. More broadly, however, it
is about the lessons that comparative law and policy may hold for
an examination of the regulation of managed care in the United
States. For while it is true, as asserted above, that we may have rela-
tively little to learn from other countries regarding managed care,
we can learn something. Indeed, we can learn four things.
First, at the macro level, we can gain perspective on the issues
that have become the focal points of our national managed care
regulation debate. Managed care is, in the end, a form of insur-
ance. Much of the debate regarding managed care regulation, at
least at the popular level, has focused on very specific problems,
23such as gag rules and the definition of an emergency. It may be
helpful for us to seek a broader perspective, returning to the fun-
damental issues of insurance regulation-dealing with moral
hazard, cream skimming, insurability, and rate-setting, for
17. See RuBi VALENZUELA MAGANA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INSTITUCIONES DE SALUD
PREVISIONAL, THE PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM IN CHILE 6, 9 (1996) [hereinafter SISP, PRI-
VATE HEALTH SYSTEM].
18. See Superintendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional, Chilean Health System
Statistics (1998) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter
SISP, Statistics].
19. See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 77-83 (discussing the Consalud and Banm6dica
ISAPREs).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 188-91.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 206-40.
23. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, Partisan House Swiftly Passes GOP Patients'
Rights Bill, WASH. POST, July 25, 1998, at A4; Todd Pack, Political Cure for Managed Care's Ills:
Lawmakers Don't Agree on a Diagnosis, but They Do Know This: Many Constituents Are Sick of Man-
aged Care, and Election Day Approaches, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 1998, at 22.
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example. Considering the issues with which Chile is struggling in
regulating health insurance may help us to gain perspective on our
own issues. In particular, observing the difficulties Chile has faced
in regulating private health insurance should help us to be more
modest in our expectations of insurance regulation. Most specifi-
cally, the Chilean experience cautions us to have modest
expectations of what is achievable through the use of regulation as
a strategy for expanding insurance coverage.
Second, in contrast, Chile's experience also demonstrates the
necessity of health insurance regulation. Some have argued in re-
cent years that health insurance markets would function more
efficiently if insurers could sell their products directly to consum-
ers with minimal regulatory oversight.2 4 Some, including Senator
Breaux, the leader of the Bipartisan Commission on the Future of
Medicare, have even argued that we ought to replace our public
insurance programs with a system under which beneficiaries would
be given vouchers with which to shop for private health insur-
ance. 2 5 Chile has essentially done this, allowing Chileans to use
their payroll tax contributions to purchase private insurance in
what were until recently largely unregulated sales transactions.26
Chile's experience offers little hope to those who see this route as
benefiting consumers.
Third, at the micro level, there is always the possibility that when
we examine another system we can gain from the transfer of regu-
latory technology. In constructing our own regulatory systems, we
can turn to the regulatory programs of other lands as a craftsper-
son goes to a toolbox, looking for instruments to assist us in getting
our job done. 7 Chile, like other countries, has developed its own
regulatory tools that we might use as we improve the design of our
own systems.
Fourth, we may learn where and how we might usefully teach.
Our consideration of other nations that are confronting the emer-
24. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 121-46 (1997); David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should
Consumers Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REv. 409, 451-66 (1998).
25. SeeJohn Breaux, Premium Supports Can Help, USA TODAY,Jan. 13, 1999, at 14A; see
also HenryJ. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The Medicare Reform Debate: What Is the Next Step?,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 8; Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model
for a New Medicare Program, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 47; Gail R. Wilensky & Joseph P.
Newhouse, Medicare: What's Right? What's Wrong? What's Next?, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999,
at 92; Einer Elhauge, Medi-Choice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 1995, at 24.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
27. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost et al., The British Health Care Reforms, the American Health
Care Revolution, and Purchaser/Provider Contracts, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 885 (1995)
(developing the notion of technology transfer in health care policy).
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gence of managed care might give us a useful perspective on our
own enterprise, in this symposium in particular and on the devel-
opment of regulatory instruments for managed care in general.
Though the United States is increasingly an importer of consumer
goods, we are just as clearly an exporter of ideas. United States
ideological and business entrepreneurs are marketing managed
care, both as an idea and as a product, throughout the world.28 To
the extent that we can design effective, efficient, and equitable ap-
proaches to regulating managed care, we have a responsibility to
share these ideas in all corners of the world where United States-
style managed care is taking root. Pondering the emergence of
managed care elsewhere in the world may remind us of this re-
sponsibility.
Before developing these themes further, however, let us first
turn to Chile and its health care system.
I. THE CHILEAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. Some History
We all remember Chile from social studies, that long thin coun-
try that runs for 1800 miles down the southern half of the western
coast of South America in the narrow strip of land between the
Andes and the Pacific. Chile has 14.5 million residents, with 84%
of the population living in urban centers, the most important of
which is the capital, Santiago, where 4.9 million live. 29 Though the
disparity of wealth distribution in Chile between the richest and
the poorest quintiles of the population is similar to that of the
United States, 0 the average per capita income is one-seventh that of
the U.S.; therefore a smaller proportion of the Chilean population
28. See, e.g., John Covaleski, U.S. Managed Care in Demand Overseas, BEST'S REV., LIFE-
HEALTH INS. ED., Nov. 1995, at 34; William Gradison, US. Health Insurers Can Export Their
Skills; Know-how in Managed Care, Supplemental Products and Technology May Help US. Health
Insurers Succeed in Expanding Overseas, BEST'S REv., LIFE-HEALTH INS. ED., July 1994, at 44;
Jost, supra note 13, at 705. The classic example of ideological entrepreneurship in health
care is Alain Enthoven's influence on British health policy in the early 1990s. See Alain C.
Enthoven, Internal Market Reform of the British National Health Service, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991,
at 60.
29. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 752 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1998).
30. Chile's highest income quintile earned 51.8% of the total income in 1992, the
poorest quintile 6.5%. See THE WORLD BANK, CHILE: THE ADULT HEALTH POLICY CHAL-
LENGE, at xvii (1995). In 1992, the United States' highest income quintile earned 44.7% of
the total income, the poorest quintile 4.3%. See. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 tbl.725 (1997).
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lives in relative comfort than in the U.S., and a larger proportion
lives in poverty.31 Chilean indicators of well being, however, such as
nutrition,2 access to potable water, education,34 and adult liter-35
acy are quite positive. Health statistics are also favorable: Chile's
infant mortality rate of thirteen per 1000 and life expectancy at
birth of seventy-five years are the best in South America and com-
36pare favorably to those of the United States. Ninety-seven percent
of Chilean children are immunized; 97% of births are profession-
ally assisted. 7
Chile has long been a leader in Latin America, and indeed in
the world, in public health care. As early as the nineteenth century
it established public health institutions to address the problem of
communicable diseases.6 It adopted a law providing for health
coverage under Social Security along the lines of the German Bis-
mark model in 1924, though coverage under this system was always
limited.39 During the 1940s, white collar workers established their
own separate social security-type health care system, the Servicio
Medico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA), which by the 1960s
had evolved into a preferred provider system under which mem-
bers could obtain care from private providers who contracted with
the system.-
31. In 1995 the GNP per capita of Chile in dollars was $4160, while the GNP per capita
of the United States was $26,980. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH
REPORT, 1998: LIFE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, A VISION FOR ALL 220 (1998) [hereinafter,
WHO, VISION]. However, in terms of purchasing power parity, that is, ability to purchase
goods and services, Chilean GNP per capita was over one-third that of the United States:
$8890 compared to $25,880 in 1994. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH
REPORT, 1997: CONQUERING SUFFERING, ENRICHING HUMANITY 152 (1997).
32. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at xvii (indicating calorie intake per day per
capita of 2584 calories in 1990).
33. See id. (indicating 95.2% access in urban areas, 73.3% access in rural areas in
1991).
34. See id. (indicating 98% primary enrollment rate, 72% secondary enrollment rate in
1991).
35. See WHO, VISION, supra note 31, at 224 (95.2% in 1995).
36. See id. at 220. In 1997, life expectancy at birth in the United States was 77, and the
infant mortality rate was seven per 1000. See id.
37. SeeJorge Jimenez de lajara & ThomasJ. Bossert, Chile's Health Sector Reform: Lessons
from Four Reform Periods, in HEALTH SECTOR REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING
HEALTH DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABLE 199, 206 (Peter Berman ed., 1995).
38. See id. at 202 (noting that a board of health was founded in 1805 for small pox vac-
cination and that a General Sanitary Bureau was created in 1887 to combat the influx of
cholera).
39. See id. Coverage was limited to workers and their families. See id.
40. See id. at 205. SERMENA was organized as a separate legal entity under Chile Law
16.781 in 1968. See Mercedes Cifuentes, Health Care, in PRIVATE SOLUTIONS TO PUBLIC PROB-
LEMS 53, 62 (Cristi~n Larroulet ed., 1993).
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In 1952, Chile began to implement a National Health Service,
the Servicio Nacional de Salud (SNS), resembling the British NHS,
which used social security payroll taxes and general tax revenues to
finance a system of public hospitals and clinics, as well as basic pub-
lic health services. 1 Salvador Allende, a physician who was Minister
of Health at the time of the creation of the SNS, led the drive for
42establishing a health service.
In 1970, Allende was elected president of Chile as a Socialist. In
1971, the Chilean Constitution was amended to establish the
State's responsibility for "medical care, both preventive and cura-
tive, [and] rehabilitation in case of accident, illness or maternity
... ."43 By the time President Allende was overthrown in a military
coup in 1973, Chile had two established models for public health
care financing: SERMENA, which provided curative health services
to white-collar workers and their families (25% of the population),
and the SNS, which provided preventive services to the entire
population and curative services to blue collar workers and indi-
gents.44 Chile has always also had, of course, a purely private health
care sector, where persons who did not qualify for or chose to seek
care outside of a public system could purchase care on a fee-for-
service basis.45 The country has also long had separate health care
systems for the military and the police, as is commonly true in
Latin America.46
The Pinochet military government that followed the coup set-
tled quickly on a course of reform for the health care system. The
military government, heavily influenced by the free market ideol-
ogy of Milton Friedman and the University of Chicago School of
Economics as well as by Pinochet's "Chicago Boys" and with little
41. See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 62; Jimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 203. The
SNS was established under Chile Law 10.383. See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 62.
42. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 205.
43. CONSTITUCi6N (1925), art. 10, § 16, 1 1 (1971), translated in GENERAL SECRETAR-
IAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE 1925,
at 9 (1972). The original 1925 Constitution, which the 1971 amendment altered, itself pro-
vided for the duty of the State to oversee public health and for the maintenance of a
national health service. See id. art. 10, § 14, 4. For a discussion of the treatment of health
by Chilean constitutions, see Bertelsen Repetto, supra note 16, at 169-72.
44. See Brian Cartin, Chile: The Effectiveness of the Reform, in Do OPTIONS EXIST? THE RE-
FORM OF PENSION AND HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 205, 206 (Marfa Amparo
Cruz-Saco & Carmelo Mesa-Lago eds., 1998). The remaining 15% of the population either
received services through the health services attached to the military or police or were unin-
sured. See id. at 206.
45. See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 63.
46. This program covers about 2.5% of the population. See Mathias Kifmann, Chile: Pri-
vate Insurance in Chile: Basic or Complementary Insurance for Outpatient Services?, 51 INT'L SOC.
SEC. REv. 137, 139 (1998).
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input from public health and medical experts, designed an ideo-
logically-based free-market model for the financing of health
47care. Though Pinochet's approach to reform remains controver-
sial, it is generally agreed that the Chilean health care system
required reform in the early 1970s."5 The system was suffering a
huge deficit attributable to overspending by the services and diffi-
culties in collecting payroll taxes from employers.49  The
government health services were also burdened by a costly, over-
centralized, and inflexible administrative structure.5 0 The health
services were subject generally to a lack of investment' Moreover,
the Pinochet government was not solely concerned with economic
efficiency. Its commitment to libertarian ideals was accompanied
by a commitment to improving health care for the very poor and to
improving preventive and primary care generally.
5
1
The Pinochet reforms were implemented slowly; full implemen-
tation did not take place until the early 1980s.-53 First, the SNS and
SERMENA were eliminated by Pinochet and two new government
health care entities were formed in their place (both under the
Ministry of Health), the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA)
which finances health care, and the Sistema Nacional de Servicios
de Salud (SNSS) which delivers health care.54 The SNSS is organ-
ized in twenty-six regional autonomous services, plus the
Environmental Health Service of Santiago. 5 These services operate
hospitals providing curative services and supervise the provision of
primary care. Second, in 1980 and 1981, management of public
primary care facilities-postas (basic primary health centers) and
consultorios (better equipped primary care clinics)-was trans-
47. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 207-08.
48. See, e.g.,Jimenez & Bossert, supra note 37.
49. See Cartin, supra note 44, at 207.
50. See id.
51. See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 59-60 (identifying stimulation of investment in
health care as a motive for privatization of health insurance).
52. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 208. Included within this was a commit-
ment to prioritizing care of mothers, children, and high-risk groups. See Cifuentes, supra
note 40, at 66-67.
53. Chile suffered two serious recessions during the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, delay-
ing the initiation of the reforms until the late 1970s and early 1980s, and full
implementation until the late 1980s. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 207.
54. See Cartin, supra note 44, at 208-09.
55. See Cartin, supra note 44, at 209; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at 3-4. The
SNSS was created through restructuring of the Ministry of Health under Decree Law 2763.
See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 69.
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feredto hemunicipalites. -6Finally, in 1981 the reforms were
completed with the creation of the ISAPRE system.57
B. The Public Health Care System
All employees and self-employed persons who contribute to the
social security pension system, as well as indigents, are covered by
FONASA, unless they elect private insurance coverage. 58 All
FONASA beneficiaries can choose either to receive services in pub-
lic facilities (for which they must pay copayments based on a
sliding scale related to income ranging from 0% to 50%) or to
purchase vouchers that allow them to receive services in FONASA's
network of private preferred providers.5 9 Approximately 82% of
FONASA services are received in public facilities, and 18% in pri-
vate facilities under the preferred provider system.60 FONASA is
financed by payroll taxes (currently set at 7% of income), general
revenue funds, fees from the sale of vouchers, and fees from the
sale of health care services. 6'
FONASA pays for services provided to its beneficiaries by the re-
gional SNSS and municipal primary care centers.6 Historically
FONASA paid hospitals based in part on budgets which covered
labor, investment, and other fixed costs, and in part on a fee-for-
service system which covered other operating costs. 63 Primary care
services were financed on a fee-for-service basis, supplemented by
revenues from the municipalities, which in particular covered in-
vestment costs. 64
56. See Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 70. This was accomplished through Decree Law
1-3036. See id.
57. See infra Part I.C.
58. See SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 1-2.
59. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at 4-5. The right to obtain health care from
private preferred providers, formerly available only to white collar workers under
SERMENA, was extended to all FONASA beneficiaries under Decree Law 2575 of 1979. See
Cifuentes, supra note 40, at 69. The statutory provision for subsidies and classification of
copayments was established under Law 18.469 in 1985. See id. at 71. Private establishments
participating in the preferred provider arrangement are classified into three levels based on
cost, but reimbursement amounts are established based on the lowest cost level. See id. at 71-
72. Beneficiaries desiring higher cost (and possibly higher quality) services pay the differ-
ence out of pocket. See id.
60. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at 4.
61. See id. at 5. Payroll taxes and general revenue contributions each account for about
40% of FONASA income. See id.
62. See id. at 3-5.
63. See id. at 5-6.
64. See id. at 6.
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Chilean public health care finance is currently undergoing a
thorough reform, under which primary care is being purchased on
a capitation basis and secondary and tertiary care on a diagnosis-
related group basis.65 Legislation that would further reform the sys-
tem was before Parliament at the time this Article was written.66 An
exploration of these reforms is beyond the scope of this Article.
The complexity of these reforms, however, and the impressiveness
of the thought that has obviously gone into them, demonstrates
the seriousness of Chile's commitment to maintaining a public
health system as a viable alternative to the private sector. This
commitment is also demonstrated by the massive investment in
public health expenditures following the end of the military dicta-
torship in 1991. The national health budget increased 50% in the
four years following the restoration of democracy, and U.S.$500
million was invested in infrastructure and equipment for the public
hospitals.67 Though the public sector remains subject to criticisms
for waste and inefficiency,6 and is plagued by shortages and wait-
ing lists, 69 beneficiaries are relatively satisfied by the services they
receive there.76
C. The ISAPREs
The ISAPREs that were created in response to the 1981 reforms
are private health insurance companies. Most are owned by small
groups of investors, though two are public corporations, and one is
65. See RONY LENZ ALCAYAGA & ROBERTO Muioz BUSTOs, FINANCIAL REFORMS IN
PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR: RESOURCE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS passim (Fonda Nacional de
Salud Work Document No. 1, 1995) (discussing proposed public sector financing and man-
agement reforms); CkSAR OYARZO & SYLVIA GALLEGUILLOS, TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A
MUTUAL INSURANCE ON HEALTH: THE REFORM AGENDA OF FONASA passim (Corporaci6n de
Promoci6n Universitaria Work Document No. 13, 1995) (discussing FONASA reforms); Ana
Sojo, Potential and Limits of Health Management Reform in Chile, CEPAL REv., Aug. 1996, at 127
(discussing public health management reform).
66. See Interview with Rony Lenz Alcayaga, Director of Fonda Nacional de Salud
(FONASA), in Santiago, Chile (June 23, 1998) (on file with author).
67. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 208-09.
68. One-thousand eight-hundred of the 4400 new personnel positions created in the
health sector in the early 1990s went to administrative personnel, who now consume 35% of
the health sector's total expenditures. See Cartin, supra note 44, at 218.
69. See Claudia Villalobos, El Enfermo Cr6nico, TEMAS DE LA EPOCA, May 17, 1998, at 1.
70. In a 1995 beneficiary satisfaction survey, 68% of ISAPRE affiliates preferred their
own system while 23% were inclined to FONASA; 66% of FONASA beneficiaries favored
their own system, while 29% valued the ISAPRE system more. See Ricardo Bitr-,n & Francisco
Xavier Almarza, Las Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPRES) en Chile 56 (1996) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
[VOL. 32:4
Managed Care Regulation
a cooperative.7' Seventeen of the currently operational ISAPREs
are open to any applicants, while eleven are closed ISAPREs, whose
membership is limited to employees of sponsoring companies or
industries. The vast majority of ISAPRE members, 3.7 of 3.9 mil-
lion, are members of open ISAPREs.75 The market is highly
concentrated, with three ISAPREs containing over 60% of the
open ISAPRE beneficiaries, and four more containing an addi-
tional 24%.74
Most of the ISAPREs function as traditional insurers.75 A few of
the ISAPREs, however, have for some time provided as well as paid
for health care,.while other ISAPREs have long had preferred pro-
vider arrangements. Consalud, the largest of the insurers, owns
thirty-five primary care and dental clinics, two hospitals, and five
ambulatory surgical centers.7' Although Consalud beneficiaries
have free choice of physicians and are not limited to Consalud fa-
cilities, about half of the ambulatory care paid for by Consalud is
provided in its centers. 8 Consalud is also able through its centers
to assert some control over referrals to secondary and tertiary
care-thus maintaining full use of capacity in its own hospitals-
and to refer patients to other providers with whom it has agree-
ments with respect to price and quality.
79
71. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, Medical Director of Banm6dica, in
Santiago, Chile (June 18, 1998) (on file with author). Two ISAPREs, Aetna and Cigna, are
subsidiaries of United States insurance companies. See Stocker et al., supra note 10, at 1133.
The largest ISAPRE, Consalud, was originated by the Construction Industry Council as part
of its welfare efforts to serve construction workers, and is nonprofit. See Interview with Ni-
colis Starck Aguilera, Director of Systems and Technologies, Consalud, in Santiago, Chile
(June 16, 1999) (on file with author). It is different from the more entrepreneurial ISAPREs
in important respects, which will be explored below.
72. See SISP, Statistics, supra note 18.
73. See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INSTITUCIONES DE SALUD PREVISIONAL, BOLETiN
ESTADiSTIco 34 tbl.2.1.8 (1997) [hereinafter, SISP, BOLETiN ESTADiSTICO].
74. See id. at 35 tbl.2.1.9.
75. In fact, patients seeking care usually first secure a voucher from their insurer by
paying the copayment and take the voucher to the provider, who then bills the insurer for
the service based on the voucher. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note
71. The system thus functions quite differently from traditional indemnity insurance in the
United States, under which the patient pays the provider first, then seeks indemnity from
the insurer.
76. See Interview with Marcelo Maira Carlini, Vice President, and Eduardo Hoyos
Lombardi, Director of Health, Consalud, in Santiago, Chile (June 16, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Carlini & Lombardi Interview].
77. See CONSALUD, LiDER EN SALUD PRIVADA 12-17 (1996) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Carlini & Lombardi Interview, supra note 76.
78. See Carlini & Lombardi Interview, supra note 76.
79. See id. Promepart, another large ISAPRE, also owns a network of hospitals and pri-
mary care clinics. See Interview with Maria Eugenia Salazar, Probenefits, in Santiago, Chile
(June 16, 1998) (on file with author).
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Banm~dica, the third largest ISAPRE, also has an integrated
structure, though it is structured differently. While Consalud owns
its clinics and other institutions, Banmtdica is owned by a parent
company, which also owns a share in several health care provid-
ers. o Banmtdica has historically not attempted to steer its insureds
towards its facilities, and only about a quarter of its beneficiaries
use its facilities.8 ' However, Banmtdica has recently formed an
HMO in cooperation with a Santiago hospital. This HMO, which
now includes about 8000 members, requires its members to choose
a gatekeeper primary care physician (an internist or pediatrician)
from a closed panel list and to obtain their care from the hospital
(Clinica Ddivila) and from three outpatient clinics affiliated with
the plan. 3
A third managed care possibility is represented by Vida Tres, a
small but affluent ISAPRE, which is developing three point-of-
service plan type arrangements with a local hospital and two man-
aged care plans. 4 Vida Tres will pay these plans on a capitated basis
for insureds who elect them.' The insured will be required to
choose an internist, gynecologist, or pediatrician as a gatekeeper
physician.8 ' The insureds will not be limited to care within the
plan, but payment for care received outside the plan will be so
minimal that few will elect it.
Finally, a number of the ISAPREs have long had preferred pro-
vider arrangements, under which insureds have lower coinsurance
obligations if they go to professionals or hospitals that have a con-
tract with their plan. 7 Chile has a strong ideology and tradition of
free choice of provider, however, and ISAPREs have been reluctant
to place too strict limits on choice.8 Moreover, the powerful Chil-
ean Medical Association is reportedly skeptical about managed
care, and the ISAPREs, which have always had a strained relation-
ship with the Medical Association, have been reluctant to court
80. See Interview with C6sar Oyarzo Mansilla, Director, and Hector Sanchez Rodriguez,
Vice President, Integramedica, in Santiago, Chile (June 14, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Mansilla & Rodriguez Interview].
81. See id.
82. See Interview with Eduardo Urrutia Hewstone, General Manager, and Lee Kort-
mansky, Chief of the Program of Health Administration, Clfnica Dfivila, in Santiago, Chile
(June 24, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hewstone & Kortmansky Interview].
83. See id.
84. See Interview with Gonzalo Sim6n, Development Director of Vida Tres, in Santiago,
Chile (June 19, 1998) (on file with author). One of the MCOs is owned by a partnership of
United States investors and Chilean physicians. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Carlini & Lombardi Interview, supra note 76.
88. See Hewstone & Kortmansky Interview, supra note 82.
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further hostility. 89 More integrated forms of managed care are,
therefore, developing slowly and quietly in Chile.
Any employee, pensioner, or other person may purchase a
health insurance policy with an ISAPRE using his or her 7% health
insurance payroll tax and whatever additional premium may be
necessary, if the applicant can find an ISAPRE willing to sell him or
her a policy.90 ISAPREs are aggressively marketed by in-house sales
agents, who are paid on a commission basis. 91 A person who pur-
chases insurance from an ISAPRE is no longer covered by
FONASA, the public default program for employees, as of the ef-
fective date of the insurance policy-he or she has moved from the
public to the private sector of health care finance."
ISAPREs have no obligation to accept an applicant for insur-
ance.93 Moreover, they may only vary premiums based on age and
sex (and coverage of plan) for those applicants whom they insure.94
ISAPREs, therefore, often refuse to sell insurance to, or charge
high rates to, the elderly or persons with cancer or other costly dis-
eases.9 Once a person is insured by an ISAPRE, however, the
power balance between the insured and insurer to a degree re-
verses. After one year an insured can leave an ISAPRE at any time
with two months notice, but an ISAPRE cannot terminate an in-
sured who has not otherwise breached the terms of the insurance
policy. 96 An ISAPRE likewise may not raise the rates that it charges
any single insured member. If it wants to increase premiums, it
must raise the rates equally for all persons insured under a particu-
lar plan and must give two months notice of such increases. 97
A person who chooses to be insured by an ISAPRE must con-
tinue to pay 7% of his employment income as the insurance
89. SeeStockeretal., supranote 10, at 1135.
90. See Law No. 18.933, arts. 29, 34, Feb. 12, 1990, 96 RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES Y RE-
GLAMENTOS 191, 208, 212 (Chile).
91. The commission structure usually takes into account the value of the policy, the
length of time the insured remains with the ISAPREs, and the track record of the insured
for paying premiums. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71. Thus,
sales agents face an incentive to sign up stable applicants with a relatively high income.
92. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 140.
93. See Bitrn & Almarza, supra note 70, at 35.
94. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 38, 96 REcoPtLAcI6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at
215-16.
95. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 147 (explaining that ISAPREs charge higher premi-
ums to elderly persons). ISAPREs do not require medical examinations, which are quite
costly, or attempt to identify unhealthy habits like smoking or alcoholism. See BitrAn & Al-
marza, supra note 70, at 34.
96. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 38, 96 RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at
215; Superintendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional, Regulation 2500, § 5.3 (on file
with author) [hereinafter SISP, Regulation].
97. See id.
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premium, up to a ceiling of 4.2 UF a month (equivalent to
98U.S.$129 in August of 1998). Persons insured by ISAPREs may
supplement the 7%, and they often pay an additional amount vol-
untarily if the 7% does not cover all desired benefits.9 An
employer may supplement the 7% with an additional amount of up
to 2% for poorer workers and claim a tax credit for the contribu-
tion, resulting in a modest, though symbolically important, public
subsidy for the ISAPRE system.
100
The application of a uniform flat percentage premium makes
sense in the context of a universal social insurance program, where
it permits cross-subsidization of poorer beneficiaries by wealthier
beneficiaries. 10' This rationale does not apply to the private ISAPREs,
however, where cross-subsidies are anathema. If a 7% minimum
premium requirement makes any sense in this context, it is to dis-
courage underinsurance. In fact, however, it is just as likely to result
in inefficient overinsurance in situations where it results in an exces-
sive payment. It also has in the past caused problems when a
beneficiary's income increased temporarily during a coverage pe-
riod, resulting in increased premium payments without increased
benefits.0 3 The insurance statute was amended in 1995 to permit
up to 10% of the 7% premium, including any money paid over the
premium price, to be placed in a type of medical savings account
held by the ISAPREs to be used for payment for health services,
including copayments, additional health benefits, or continuation
of coverage in case of unemployment or upon retirement. 4 The
98. See SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 5. The UF is a unit of measure
adjusted automatically for inflation on a monthly basis. It is widely used in Chile for financial
transactions and is thus commonly understood. See id. at 5 n.2. Though $129 is a modest
sum in terms of United States health insurance costs, it is a significant amount considering
that the average income of a member of an open ISAPRE was $658 monthly in 1995. See id.
at 13.
99. SeeKifmann, supra note 46, at 139.
100. The 2% subsidy when added to the 7% premium may not exceed one UF (about
$30.62 in August 1998) for the insured plus .5 UF ($15.31) for each dependent, so only
persons of very modest income are eligible for the subsidy. See Law No. 18.566, art. 8, Oct.
24, 1986, 88 RECOPILACION DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS 102, 119 (Chile). This subsidy cur-
rently makes up about 2.8% of ISAPRE revenues. SeeSISP, Statistics, supra note 18.
101. See Osvaldo Larrafiaga, Eficiencia y Equidad en el Sistema de Salud Chileano 9
(n.d.) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). FONASA presumably
uses the 7% contribution in this way, though it is attempting to separate out its indigent
members, who pay no premium, into a separate category fiscally to avoid this cross-subsidy
between premium payers and non-premium payers. See OYARZO & GALLEGUILLOS, supra
note 65, at 6-8.
102. SeeKifmann, supra note 46, at 143.
103. See id.
104. See Law No. 18.933, art 32, Feb. 12, 1990, 96 REcoPjLAC16N DE LEYES Y REGLAMEN-
TOS 191, 211 (Chile).
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ISAPREs are permitted to charge handling fees for these accounts,
however, and these fees are often large enough to make the ac-
count of little value.
10 5
Though most ISAPRE policies are purchased by individuals, 35
to 40% are negotiated as collective policies covering a firm's em-
ployees as a group. 06 Collective policies tend to offer more
favorable coverage for many employees than individual policies
because the proportion of the premium devoted to sales and un-
derwriting costs is lower, higher income employees subsidize lower
income employees (though there are often several benefit levels
within collective plans for' different levels of employees), and col-
lective policy negotiators tend to drive a harder bargain with the
ISAPREs."°" Some ISAPREs are unenthusiastic about collective poli-
cies, however, because the freedom of movement guaranteed
beneficiaries allows higher income employees to opt out of collec-
tive plans, undermining the underwriting assumptions on which
the plan was based.108
An ISAPRE policy must cover both the insured and his or her
spouse and children.' 9 ISAPREs may also agree to cover additional
dependents, such as parents, though this is not common. ll Where
both spouses work, they may either have separate policies or may
purchase marital policies, for which the premium is based on the
average wage of the two spouses."' A family may not be split be-
tween FONASA and an ISAPRE-if one spouse is privately insured
the entire family must be."'
ISAPREs are required to cover each of the services covered by
FONASA and under recent regulations must also cover these serv-
ices at least to the extent that they would be covered under
FONASA.1 FONASA is subject to high coinsurance, however, for
114
wealthier insureds purchasing private insurance,' so this coverage
requirement is rather minimal. Most ISAPREs exceed it. ISAPREs
may only exclude a short list of services or conditions, such as
105. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 143.
106. See Bitrdin & Almarza, supra note 70, at 34.
107. See Interview with Maria Eugenia Salazar, supra note 79.
108. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71.
109. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 41, 96 REcopIrACi6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at
216-17.
110. See id.
111. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, Director, Legal Department, SISP, in
Santiago, Chile (June 24, 1998) (on file with author).
112. See id.
113. See SISP, Regulation 36 (on file with author).
114. See Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, Chief, Audit Department, SISP, in San-
tiago, Chile (June 22, 1998) (on file with author).
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cosmetic surgery (for the purposes of beautification, not of repair
of malformation), nursing care at home or in institutions, or serv-
ices required because of war or criminal conduct."5 They may only
impose waiting periods for pregnancy and preexisting condi-
tions."6 Costs associated with pregnancy need only be covered
proportionately to the amount of time remaining in the pregnancy
at the time of admission to the ISAPRE, i.e. a woman becoming
insured with three months remaining in her pregnancy would be
covered for one third of her maternity costs. 1 7 Under recently is-
sued regulations, preexisting conditions must be covered fully after
eighteen months. 8 Prior to the end of the eighteen months, at
least one quarter of costs must be covered. 9
ISAPRE policies are commonly subject to significant coinsurance
obligations, though ISAPREs do offer full coverage policies to
those willing to pay for them. 120 Copayments average a little over
30% for most insureds, though a small percentage of insureds with
high costs of care pay almost 50%.121 More importantly, coverage is
almost always subject to caps, both globally and service by service.
12
Historically, these caps have not been expressed in readily under-
standable terms of pesos or UFs but by reference to a separate
company list of general coverage specifications, which is not readily
available. Insurers may have, therefore, only a vagues understand-
ing of their coverage.
ISAPREs not only cover medical care, they also pay for sick leave.
In fact, ISAPREs spend about 18% to 23% of their claims-related
115. See Law No. 18.933, art. 33(b), Feb. 12, 1990, 96 REcOPILAcI6N DE LEYES Y RE-
GLAMENTOS 191, 211 (Chile); Superintendencia de Instituciones de Salud Previsional,
Circular No. 025, § 5 (Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter SISP, Circular No. 025].
116. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 33, 96 REcoPItAci6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at
211-12; SISP, Regulation 2263, § 5.2.1 (on file with author). Treatment related to a nonre-
ported preexisting condition must be covered unless the last medical treatment for the
condition took place within the preceding five years and the insured knowingly concealed
the existence of the condition. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 33(b), 96 RECOPILACION DE
LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at 211.
117. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 33(e), 96 REcOPILAcION DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS
at 212.
118. See SISP, Circular No. 025, supra note 115, § 5.2.1. The regulation only applies to
disclosed pre-existing illnesses. Concealed pre-existing conditions need not be covered until
five years have elapsed. See id. § 5.2.3.
119. Seeid.§5.2.1.
120. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71.
121. See Bitrdn & Almarza, supra note 70, at 31-32. Copayments cannot exceed 75% un-
der law. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art 33(b), 96 REcoPLAcION DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at
211.
122. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 144.
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expenditures on medical leave.123 ISAPREs must pay sick leave if a
doctor certifies an insured to be unable to work. 12 4 Until 1990 the
ISAPREs were also responsible for maternity leave, to which a
pregnant woman is entitled from forty-two days before the birth
until eighty-four days after.2 5 As of 1990, the state took over re-
sponsibility for the cost of maternity leave. 12 6 Even not considering
pregnancy leaves, however, working women request sick leave twice
as often as men, contributing to the preference of ISAPREs for in-
suring men rather than women. 127 It is also widely believed that
fraudulent certification of sick leave presents a significant prob-
lem. 1
28
Most of the ISAPREs are for-profit entities.29 They are, on aver-
age, quite profitable. Profits can be evaluated two different ways: as
a proportion of income, or as a return on investment. Profits as a
proportion of income have been quite modest in recent years, av-
eraging about 5%.130 Profit as a return on investment has been
much higher, averaging 25% in 1994 and 1995.' 3' Profit varies con-
siderably among ISAPREs, however, with larger ISAPREs tending
to make much higher profits than smaller ISAPREs. Because
profit is relatively small compared to operating costs, moreover, it
is very volatile, with some ISAPREs experiencing large losses in
133some years.
ISAPREs have relatively high operating costs, which are smaller
for larger ISAPREs and have diminished over time. Between 1985
and 1995 the percentage of ISAPRE revenues actually returned to
123. See SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 45. For 1996 the figure was
19%. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRE-PAIL HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, ISAPREs, THE
PRIVATE HEALTH SECTOR IN CHILE 23 (1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
124. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 37, at 214-15. The insurance companies have medi-
cal controllers to attempt to identify and deny unnecessary or excessive sick leaves. About
3% of requests for leave are rejected. See Bitren & Almarza, supra note 70, at 40. Beneficiar-
ies whose applications are denied or modified may appeal to a supervisory body, the
Comisi6n de Medicina Preventiva e Invalidez, where they usually win. See Interview with
Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71.
125. SeeSISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 45 n.1l.
126. See Chile Law No. 18.933, art. 21, 96 RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS at 202;
see generally Law No. 18.469, art. 9, Nov. 14, 1985, 85 RECOPILACI6N DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS
245, 248 (Chile).
127. See SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 45.
128. See id. at 46; see also Carlini & Lombardi Interview, supra note 76.
129. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71.
130. See Bitrdn & Almarza, supra note 70, at 47.
131. See id. at 48-49.
132. Banm~dica received an 88.4% return on investment in 1995 while Vida Tres re-
ceived 76.7%. Consalud, the largest ISAPRE is nonprofit and made only 4.6%. See id. at 50.
133. See id. at 47-49.
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beneficiaries in the form of medical reimbursements and sick leave
increased from 59.5% to 71.5%. M In 1997, 18.9% of ISAPREs'
revenues were spent on sales and administrative expenses.135
D. The Effects of the ISAPRE System
Working in tandem, the characteristics of the ISAPRE system de-
scribed to this point result in the peculiar nature of the Chilean
ISAPRE system. First, ISAPRE coverage is skewed towards the
wealthier members of society. The average monthly wage of
ISAPRE members in 1997 was about U.S.$700, while the average
wage of FONASA beneficiaries (excluding indigents) was
U.S.$250.136 Over 33% of ISAPRE members earn more than
U.S.$830 a month, and over 63%, more than U.S.$400.1 3 7 This is
not surprising; indeed, private insurance is relied on throughout
the world to permit persons of means to opt for a higher level of
services than that provided through social insurance systems, and
the Chilean system in particular was designed to reserve the pub-
licly subsidized health system for the less fortunate. In fact, the
remarkable thing about the ISAPRE system is not that it is skewed
to the wealthy, but rather that it extends so far down into the
population and covers people of such modest means. Over one
third of ISAPRE members earn less than US$400 a month, which
means that their 7% premiums equal less than US$28 a month,
unless they are supplemented by the employer or employee. It is
also to Chile's credit that privatizing health insurance for the
wealthy has not meant the abandonment of the public health in-
surance program, which in fact has received relatively generous
increases in support in recent years.139
A second characteristic, however, is that coverage is skewed to-
ward young, healthy males. ISAPRE coverage drops dramatically
upon retirement (indeed, as early as fifty-five). Only 10% of
ISAPRE members are fifty-five or over, only 2.7% are sixty-five or
134. See id. at 43.




139. SeeJimenez & Bossert, supra note 37, at 208-09. These increases in investment, it
should be noted, date from the 1990s, after the period of military government, though eco-
nomic conditions during the 1980s would have made investment difficult during that period
in any event. See id. at 207.
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over, and only 2.7% are pensioners."" Some ISAPREs will not ac-
cept applicants who are over a certain age, and all charge higher
premiums (two to four and a half times the rate of a middle-aged
person) to the elderly.' As noted above, women of child-bearing
age also have a difficult time securing ISAPRE coverage in their
own right, in part because of their higher use of sick leave. Sixty-
nine percent of ISAPRE primary insured individuals are men.142
Women are much more likely to be insured as dependents of in-
sureds, because dependents cannot receive sick leave, but in the
prime child-bearing years between twenty and thirty-five only about
46% of total ISAPRE beneficiaries, including primary insureds and
dependents, are women. 43 Once women reach age thirty-five, they
are as likely to be insured by ISAPREs as men.144
A third characteristic of the ISAPRE system is its bizarre multi-
plicity of health care plans. A health care plan is a particular policy
covering a particular configuration of services, coinsurance, and
caps, marketed by a particular ISAPRE.' 45 Though it is difficult to
discover the number of health care plans that exist within the
ISAPRE system, the number is truly enormous. Persons within the
Superintendency estimate that 10,000 plans existed, with 1000 or
so available at any one time, but individuals affiliated with particu-
lar ISAPREs with whom I spoke estimated that their ISAPREs alone
have thousands of plans.
46
This great number of plans exists for two primary reasons. First,
the multiplicity allows exquisite price discrimination. The statutory
7% premium is a continuous variable, because the level of wages
varies continuously. Each ISAPRE, thus, must offer a large number
of plans so that at any premium, corresponding to 7% of any given
wage level, a variety of choices is available. One expert estimated
that if premiums were allowed to vary from 6.5% to 7.5%, 80% of
the plans would disappear.
I 7
The second reason is a peculiar form of indirect experience rat-
ing that grows out of the ISAPREs' response to the legal
prohibition against direct experience rating. This law, as stated
140. See SISP, BOLETIN ESTADiSTICO, supra note 73, at tbl.2.1.7. Because only 6.6% of
the Chilean population is over 65, these figures are not quite as skewed as they appear. See
SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 17, at 10.
141. See Bitrfin & Almarza, supra note 70, at 70-72.
142. See SISP, Statistics, supra note 18, at tbl.5.
143. See id. at tbI.4.
144. See id.
145. See Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, supra note 114.
146. See Interview with Gonzalo Sim6n, supra note 84.
147. See Interview with Franciso Quesney Langlois, supra note 71.
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above, 14 requires that ISAPREs must raise premiums across the
board for an entire plan if they want to raise rates at all, and pro-
hibits raising premiums for individuals who require expensive
medical care. It is widely believed that ISAPREs do in fact raise
premiums, sometimes dramatically, for plans with which they have
negative experiences, but then create new plans that closely re-
semble the old plan and offer them to persons that have a
favorable claims experience under the old plan." 9 Thus high cost
insureds pay more or leave the plan while less costly insureds move
to new plans, permitting indirect experience rating but also adding
to the multiplicity of plans.
Defenders of the ISAPRE system believe that the multiplicity of
plans signifies healthy competition and promotes consumer
choice. Skeptics believe, however, that the multiplicity of plans
makes true comparison among insurers difficult, if not impossi-
ble. 150 This is particularly true because coverage limitations are
often expressed in terms of internal insurance company schedules
that are difficult to locate and understand. 5' The fact that health
insurance is sold only by agents of particular companies, rather
than by independent agents marketing a variety of policies, makes
comparison even more difficult.
A fourth characteristic of the system is that it covers primary care
services much more effectively than it does catastrophic care. The
ubiquitous presence of caps for most services and of overall caps
makes ISAPRE insurance coverage of limited use for catastrophic
conditions, though ISAPREs also make catastrophic policies
available-for a price. 152 ISAPREs are most valuable for covering
routine services, and ISAPRE insureds tend to consult doctors
more often than those insured by the public sector (3.3 medical
visits per beneficiary per year compared to 2.4 visits per year for
the public sector).' Indeed, one analyst has argued that private
insurance in Chile operates much like private insurance in other
148. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
149. See Mansilla & Rodriguez Interview, supra note 80.
150. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 143.
151. See Interview with Fernando RiverosVidal, supra note 114.
152. See Bitrn & Alnarza, supra note 70, at 65 (noting that copayments for catastrophic
illness reach as high as 56.5%). Catastrophic policies are issued by life as well as health in-
surance companies. Catastrophic policies often exclude certain diseases or coverage of the
elderly. See id.; see also URI WAINER K., HACIA UNA MAYOR EQUIDAD EN LA SALUD: EL CASO
DE LAS ISAPREs, 29-32, U.N. Doc. LC/L.1036 (1997) (Spanish version) (citing studies find-
ing that a small but significant number of ISAPRE beneficiaries encounter uncovered
medical expenses that are catastrophic relative to their income, particularly persons who
have low coverage plans and seek care from high cost hospitals).
153. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 30, at 12.
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countries that have national health services, i.e., as a supplement to
rather than a substitute for the NHS coverage.154
When ISAPRE beneficiaries require catastrophic care, they al-
ways have the option of returning to the public FONASA program
by canceling ISAPRE coverage.'55 Indeed, FONASA does not know
precisely whom it covers, and it is widely believed that ISAPRE
members routinely receive services in SNSS hospitals at FONASA
expense once their ISAPRE caps are exceeded, even though this
technically is not permitted except in emergencies. 156 FONASA
serves, therefore, as a reinsurer for those insured by the ISAPREs.
A final characteristic of the ISAPRE system, therefore, is that a
significant cross-subsidization takes place between the public and
private sectors. Subsidization clearly flows from the public to the
private sector in several respects. The public sector bears the cost
of maternity leave and immunization and other public health pro-
grams for ISAPRE as well as FONASA beneficiaries. 1 17 ISAPRE
premiums and disbursements are exempt from taxation (as are
those of FONASA), but additionally, up to 2% of employer contri-
butions to ISAPREs above the 7% premium can be exempt from
taxation for low income insureds, a benefit not available to
FONASA members. 158 Moreover, as just noted, FONASA subsidizes
the ISAPREs by providing care to their members in catastrophic
cases.
On the other hand, the ISAPREs also subsidize the public sector,
though the subsidies are less obvious. First, many professionals who
work in the public sector also provide care on a fee-for-service basis' 59
to ISAPRE beneficiaries. Many of these professionals make the
bulk of their income in the private sector and deliver care for
much lower compensation in the public sector. In fact, the IS-
APREs have generally made a significant contribution to the
development of a private health infrastructure in Chile, freeing up
154. SeeKifmann, supra note 46, at 145.
155. See id.
156. See Bitrfn & Almarza, supra note 70, at 67; Larrafiaga, supra note 101, at 27; Inter-
view with Giorgio Solimano, President of CORSAPS, in Santiago, Chile (June 19, 1998) (on
file with author). FONASA is trying to establish a comprehensive list of its beneficiaries, but
currently can identify only 90 to 95%. FONASA, however, is supposed to get lists from the
ISAPREs of their beneficiaries, and public hospitals are in the process of developing systems
of certification that would require them to verify insurance status at time of admission.
Where hospitals discover that a patient is a member of an ISAPRE, they are supposed to bill
the ISAPRE and the patient for their respective obligations for the cost of the care. See Inter-
view with Rony Lenz Alcayaga, supra note 66.
157. See Larrafiaga, supra note 101, at 26-27.
158. See id.
159. See Interview with Giorgio Solimano, supra note 156.
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public health facilities to treat public beneficiaries.60 Second, some
believe that the reported higher rates of physician visits by ISAPRE
members compared to publicly insured patients may be in part due
to fraudulent receipt of ISAPRE benefits by persons who are in fact
publicly insured.161 Controls over the receipt of ISAPRE-financed
services appear to be quite ineffective.
II. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM CHILE
A. The Difficult Task of Insurance Regulation
First, understanding the Chilean experience with regulation of
private health insurance can give us a broader perspective on our
own task. In particular, it reminds us of the universal nature of the
game between the insurer and insured that insurance represents
and of the difficult but necessary task that regulators must play to
referee that game. Insurance exists because most of us are risk
averse. We would rather face a certain but manageable cost in the
present than the cost of a much greater but uncertain future risk,
even if in the end the amount we pay now to avoid that risk ex-
ceeds the cost of the feared risk itself, adjusted for the probability
of incurring the risk. 162 We prefer to pay a fixed insurance pre-
mium every month and to rest in the certainty that if and when we
face major medical bills they will be covered by our insurance.1
3
Insurance companies, on the other hand, are willing to accept
premiums from large numbers of insureds in exchange for accept-
160. The percentage of total hospital beds in private hospitals grew from 10% in 1981
to 25% in 1993. See SISP, PRIVATE HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 17, at 32.
161. See Carlini & Lombardi Interview, supra note 76.
162. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 2 (2d ed. 1995); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 13-14 (2d ed.
1996).
163. For reasons that are less clear, many people seem quite willing to obtain insurance
against high frequency, low cost events such as the use of optical or dental services. See Paul
Slovic et al., Preferencefor Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44J. RISK
& INS. 237 (1977). In the United States this is probably explained in part by the tax subsidy
that is available for employment-related insurance. See SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION:
WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 83-84, 88 (1997) (addressing payment of insurance premiums
with pre-tax dollars). In Chile, the relatively low expenditure caps imposed on insurance
policies result in most privately insured individuals being better covered for frequent, low
cost losses than for catastrophic losses. Undoubtedly this is to a considerable degree due to




ing responsibility for the costs of expensive, unpredictable events. ' 64
The law of large numbers permits insurers to pool a large number
of uncertain individual risks into a highly predictable obligation.
165
They can only perform this function, however, if the premiums
they collect are sufficient in size to cover the costs of the insured
losses, administrative costs (including marketing, underwriting,
claims processing, and other costs), and a reasonable profit.166 The
task of insurance rate-setting is to establish a premium that can
cover a defined benefit package plus administrative costs and prof-
its for a particular insured.1
7
While both parties to the insurance contract benefit from this
exchange, the relationship is inherently problematic. First, there is
the problem of adverse selection resulting from asymmetry of in-
formation. '8 The insured may have a better understanding of his
or her risk exposure than does the insurer and thus faces a finan-
cial incentive to use this information to secure greater coverage for
a given premium than would be actuarially warranted given the
actual risk faced by the insured.6 9 The woman who suspects that
she is pregnant or the man who has recently experienced chest
pains may purchase insurance policies without disclosing their cur-
rent situation, and thus gain the favorable premiums offered to
healthy persons.
Health insurers have a fairly standard armamentarium of weap-
ons with which to combat adverse selection. They exclude, either
permanently or for a set time, coverage of certain diseases, com-
monly including conditions that pre-exist coverage, or at least that
have resulted in diagnosis or treatment before coverage com-
mences.7 They insure groups of employees, which are likely to
present fairly good risks because group members are working, are
. 164. That is to say, insurers both accept the transfer of and pooling of risk. See ABRA-
HAM, supra note 162, at 2.
165. See id.;JERRY, supra note 162, at 14.
166. See ABRAHAM, supra note 162, at 106-10. Because risk averse individuals are by
definition willing to pay a premium that is larger than the expected value of a potential loss
(i.e., the product of the probability of the loss occurring times its magnitude should it oc-
cur), insurance companies can in fact charge premiums sufficient to cover these costs. See id.
at 2. With respect to some types of insurance where payment for a loss occurs sometime after
the loss is incurred (e.g., liability insurance), the insurance company also must take into
account investment income gained from invested premiums. See id. at 107.
167. One of the tasks of insurers, therefore, is risk allocation-determining the level of
premium that is proportionate to the degree of risk posed by each insured. See id. at 2.
168. See id. at 3-4. The classic treatment of this problem is Michael Rothschild &Joseph
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Infor-
mation, 90 QUART.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
169. See ABRAHAM, supra note 162, at 3-4.
170. See Bitrhn & Almarza, supra note 70, at 34; Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 83-84.
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unlikely to include many persons seeking insurance solely because
of likelihood of illness, are often large enough to spread risk fairly
broadly, and cost less to insure than individuals in terms of under-
writing and marketing costs. 1 7' Finally, insurers often require
disclosure of medical history and medical records or medical ex-
aminations by approved physicians to screen out unhealthy
applicants.1
72
Two can play at the risk transfer game, however, and insurers of-
ten engage in cream skimming, seeking to attract insureds who will
cost relatively little given the premiums they are willing and able to
pay and to exclude high risk insureds altogether.173 Though insur-
ers usually know less about the individuals who seek insurance
from them than the individuals know about themselves, insurers
can be relatively confident that younger persons are better risks
than older persons, that young men are better risks than young
women, and that insured employees become riskier over time.
7 4
Alternatively, insurers set their rates through tiered, experience,
and durational ratings to make certain that higher risk insureds
175pay their own way through higher premiums.
Once they obtain insurance, insureds face the temptation to use
their insurance coverage to the maximum extent possible to get
the full benefit of their policy. This is the problem of moral haz-
ard.77 The problem of moral hazard takes on peculiar
characteristics in the health insurance arena, because there are
really two parties that benefit from health insurance: insureds and
the providers who care for them. Both face incentives to take ad-
vantage of insurers, but providers are often a greater threat to
insurers than insureds. Few persons intentionally become ill to take
advantage of their health insurer; indeed, most persons would pre-
fer not to have to go to doctors or hospitals. Providers who are
paid on a fee-for-service basis, on the other hand, have every rea-
son to want to provide as many and as expensive services for their
171. See Bitr-n & Almarza, supra note 70, at 34; Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 83.
172. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 82.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 82-83.
175. See id. Tiered rating charges different insureds different rates based on their po-
tential risk; experience rating ties premiums to claims experience; durational rating is
charging higher rates for customers who are renewing their policies. See id.
176. See ABRAHAM, supra note 162, at 4; Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 84.
177. See GLIED, supra note 163, at 78 (discussing the deterrent effect of noninsurable
costs of being ill, such as pain, suffering, and time). Insured persons may take more health
risks and are likely to seek more care and more costly care once they become ill, however.
See id. at 74-76 (addressing the moral hazard of providing health insurance).
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insured patients as possible.178 Again, asymmetry of information
problems come into play. The provider often knows more about
the insured's condition than does either the insurer or the insured
and can use this information to take maximum advantage of both.
Moreover, when, as in Chile and in some other countries with
social insurance, the health insurer is responsible for sick leave
pay, the insured faces more direct and immediate incentives to
take advantage of the insurer. 79 As noted earlier,8 0 there is wide-
spread belief that sick leave insurance is widely abused in these
countries by employees who are dissatisfied with their work, or
simply do not feel like working.'
8
1
Health insurers have a range of traditional tools for dealing with
moral hazard. Cost-sharing, in the form of deductibles, copay-
ments, and coinsurance, is perhaps the most common.182
Utilization review of discrete services provided to particular pa-
tients is another. 83 Statistical review of the caseload of particular
providers is a third.184 Caps on coverage, a fourth strategy, place a
limit on the insurer's aggregate exposure to the demands of any
particular insured, on a service by service basis or in total.
85
Managed care is primarily, from the prospective of the health in-
surer, a tool for addressing the problem of moral hazard. 8 6 In less
rigorous forms of managed care this is done through utilization
review; through the withholding of funds to cover, in part, the cost
of tests, referrals, or hospital admissions; or through the granting
of bonuses if such costs are avoided. In the strongest forms of
managed care, where capitation is used, the provider's incentives
are aligned with the insurer to limit the potential of moral hazard
on the part of the insured.
8 7
178. See MARKA. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 181 (1997).
179. When Bismark originated the German health insurance system in the nineteenth
century, its primary purpose was to provide income rather than health care for sick workers.
See Peter Rosenberg, The Origin and Development of Compulsory Health Insurance in Germany, in
POLITICAL VALUES AND HEALTH CARE: THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 105, 113 (Donald W. Light
& Alexander Schuller eds., 1986).
180. See supra text accompanying note 128.
181. See MICHAEL ARNOLD, SOLIDARITAT 2000: DIE MEDIZINISCHE VERSORGUNG UND
IHRE FINANZIERUNG NACH DERJAHRTAUSENDWENDE 129 (1995).
182. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 84-85; see also HALL, supra note 178, at 15-61
(evaluating this strategy).
183. See 2 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 46-53 (2d ed. 1995).
184. This approach is used in Germany, seeJost, supra note 13, at 669-77, and by some
managed care organizations in the United States.
185. See Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 85-86.
186. See id. at 84.
187. See HALL, supra note 178, at 186-89.
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The primary role of insurance regulation has traditionally been
to assure that insurers play the game fairly.""8 The specific form that
such regulation takes will depend on the basic ground rules under
which the insurance system operates. In Chile, for example, the
premium for health insurance is more or less fixed at 7% of in-
come, while the benefit package varies widely; in the United States
premiums vary widely while the benefit package is more standard.
Where, as in the United States, managed care becomes common,
underprovision of care becomes a serious regulatory concern. Un-
derprovision is, of course, much less of an issue for insurance
regulators in a fee-for-service environment.
The most basic task of regulators is to assure that insurers are
able to pay for unexpected events as they occur-that they are sol-
vent."" In Chile this is accomplished through requirements that
insurers meet minimum capital requirements and deposit a guar-
anty equaling one month's worth of benefits payments collected
with the SISP.' 90 The SISP also regularly and frequently audits the
ISAPREs to assure their continued financial responsibility.'9 '
The regulator can also attempt to control the use by insurers of
various devices that address adverse selection or moral hazard to
protect insureds from overreaching or to protect particular in-
sureds or classes of insureds from discrimination. Thus, in Chile,
the law prohibits the total exclusion of coverage for most medical
conditions, forbids the imposition of waiting periods in most in-
stances, restricts the use of categories other than age and sex for
rate setting, and limits the use of preexisting condition clauses and
restrictions on the coverage of expenses related to pregnancy.192
The first lesson to be learned from the Chilean experience,
however, is that as long as one is functioning in a market for pri-
vate insurance and operating under a basic principle of freedom of
contract, there are real limits on how much regulation can accom-
plish, particularly if the intent of the regulation is to expand
insurance coverage. The Chilean experience shows us that if an
188. Chollet & Lewis break this purpose down into three goals: maintaining a stable in-
surance market, protecting consumers, and maximizing consumer access to insurance. See
Chollet & Lewis, supra note 1, at 87.
189. See id. at 87-89; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HRD-94-26, HEALTH
INSURANCE REGULATION: WIDE VARIATION IN STATE'S AUTHORITY, OVERSIGHT, AND RE-
SOURCES 8-10 (1993).
190. See Law No. 18.933, arts. 25-27, Feb. 12, 1990, 96 RECOPILACION DE LEYES Y RE-
GLAMENTOS 191, 206-07 (Chile).
191. See Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, supra note 114. The SISP has 15 control-
lers on staff, who visit each ISAPRE on average four and a half times a year.
192. See Chile Law No. 18.933, arts. 33, 33b, 38, 96 RECOPILACION DE LEYES Y RE-
GLAMENTOS at 211-12, 215-16.
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insurance regulator limits the use of preexisting conditions clauses
or exclusions of conditions but does not guaranty access to private
insurance, insurers can simply refuse to deal with persons who are
sick, old, or of child-bearing age. If, as the Chilean experience
demonstrates, a regulator requires insurers to guarantee renewabil-
ity of insurance for persons already insured, insurers will be more
selective as to whom they insure and will find ways, if possible, to
drive away insureds who are proving to be expensive. 93
In the end a private insurer will, and must, find ways to limit
both whom it insures and the risks that it insures. Though attempts
to limit the options available to insurers for doing so may be justi-
fied on grounds of fairness, they will also usually result in
distortions elsewhere in the market and sometimes be of marginal
value to those whom they are intended to protect. This is con-
firmed not only by the Chilean experience, but also by our own
experience with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act 94 and with various state insurance reforms. 195 In the end,
private health insurance schemes cannot assure equitable access to
health care for all, no matter how they are regulated.
The message here for managed care regulation is that we are
likely to meet the same barriers in attempting to regulate insurers'
attempts to limit moral.hazard that Chile has encountered in at-
tempting to regulate the responses of insurers to adverse selection.
There is some truth in what insurers in the United States have
been saying loudly and insistently: managed care regulation comes
at a cost.196 If insurers are limited in their ability to control moral
193. This seems to be what is happening with the implementation of guaranteed issue
and renewability provisions of HIPAA in the United States. See, e.g., Geri Aston, Insurance
Reform Law Falls Short, Am. MED. NEWS, Sept. 14, 1998, at 1.
194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1182, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41.
195. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. T-HEHS-98-114,
HEALTH INSURANCE STANDARDS: IMPLICATIONS OF NEW FEDERAL LAW FOR CONSUMERS,
INSURERS, REGULATORS (1998) (detailing problems with implementation of HIPPA); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. HEHS-98-67, HEALTH INSURANCE STANDARDS:
NEW FEDERAL LAW CREATES CHALLENGES FOR CONSUMERS, INSURERS, REGULATORS (1998)
(same); Robert Kutmer, The American Health Care System-Health Insurance Coverage, 340 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 163 (1999).
196. The cost of regulation is hotly contested, with industry estimates of the cost of 1998
Democratic proposals ranging from the wildly inflated but still oft quoted estimate of a 23%
increase in health insurance costs put out by Millman and Roberts, see Stephen Blakely, The
Backlash Against Managed Care, NATION'S BUS., July 1998, at 16, to a lower estimate of 2.7 to
8.6% increase from the Barents Group. See Insurance Regulation: Managed Care Debate Aimed at
Public, but Close Look at Polls Show Mixed Signals, HEALTH CARE DAILY BNA, July 6, 1998. Coo-
pers and Lybrand has estimated that the 1998 House Republican proposal for a point-of-
service option would result in premium increases of between $.58 and $7.01 per person per
month, depending on the rate of cost-sharing that would be allowed. See id. Increases in the
cost of insurance would in all likelihood result in more persons being uninsured, though the
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hazard, the cost of insurance will certainly increase and its avail-
ability will certainly decrease. With respect to each proposal for
regulation of managed care, and in particular proposals directed at
expanding coverage or benefits, we must attempt to discover how
much the proposal is likely to cost, on whom the cost will be im-
posed, and whether the cost will exceed the benefit. Certainly in
some instances the benefit will justify the cost, but the calculation
cannot be avoided and must always be made.
B. The Necessary Task of Insurance Regulation
While Chile's experience cautions us to be sober and modest in
our expectations of regulation, particularly regulation intended to
expand access and coverage, it also demonstrates the problems
caused by largely unregulated insurance markets. In recent years
advocates of free markets have been very effective in convincing
the public and policy makers that regulation is more often than
not counterproductive. 197 Though it has long been argued that
health care markets are more in need of regulation than other
markets, free market advocates have recently begun to argue that
even here regulation is generally unnecessary and harmful.9 s Some
have even argued for the privatization of public programs, by giv-
ing program beneficiaries vouchers and then allowing them to use
these vouchers to purchase private insurance in private markets'9
Chile has in fact privatized part of its social insurance programs
insofar as Chileans can take the 7% of their wages formerly dedi-
cated to social health insurance and use it to purchase private
insurance. Until recently, the insurance purchase transaction itself
was largely unregulated. Insurers had to provide a minimum bene-
fit package but were otherwise largely unregulated in their
premiums, cost sharing requirements, exclusions, coverage terms,
and sales practices.20 0 The result was a situation in which many con-
estimate of the Lewin Group that 400,000 persons would lose health insurance coverage for
every 1% increase in premiums, which again has been widely quoted, is too high. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. T-HEHS-99-147, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
IMPACT OF PREMIUM INCREASES ON THE NUMBER OF COVERED INDIVIDUALS IS UNCERTAIN 69
(1999).
197. SeeJERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23-25 (1997) (discussing the effects of deregulatory reform
movements).
198. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 121-46; Hyman, supra note 24, at 451-66.
199. See sources cited supra note 25.
200. See Kifmann, supra note 46, at 142-43.
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sumers were underinsured,"' some were overinsured ,2° many had
large gaps in coverage, 203 and most were thoroughly confused and
uncertain as to what their insurance would actually cover. Had the
public system not continued as a safety net, many Chileans would
undoubtedly have found themselves without resources to pay for
needed medical care.
In the recent past Chile has moved toward a form of managed
competition, attempting to limit exclusions and cost-sharing
through regulation and to produce useful comparative informa-
tion. The SISP has attempted to assure that insureds have at least
the possibility of understanding the contract that the insurer is of-
fering them. It has promulgated regulations requiring insurers to
use a common chart to present comparable information as to the
extent of their coverage of fifty-three procedures, including serv-
ices that together account for 80% of the ISAPREs on health
services, plus representative, high cost catastrophic services (such
as cardiovascular surgery) and common, low cost services (such as
urine tests) .204 The regulator can also attempt to assure that poli-
cies provide at least a basic level of coverage corresponding to the
expectations of most insureds. Another recent Chilean regulation
requires insurers to cover at least 25% of the cost of any procedure
covered by FONASA.205 Though it is too early to judge the effects of
these forms of regulation, it is possible to judge from Chile's past
experience that largely unregulated markets are highly problem-
atic.
C. The Possibility of Technology Transfers
The United States has developed, in the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a sophisticated and effective
mechanism for promoting the sharing of information among the
states with respect to approaches to regulating insurance. 206 The
NAIC acts as a clearinghouse, developing draft statutes and regula-
tions that can be used as models by state legislatures and
201. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
202. See supra text accompanying note 102.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
204. See SISP, Regulation 2263, § 7 (on file with author); Interview with'Fernando
Riveros Vidal, supra note 114.
205. See SISP, Regulation 2500, § 4.1 (on file with author).
206. SeeJERRY, supra note 162, at 99-100.
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regulators. °7 It is possible, however, that we can learn not only
from approaches developed domestically but also from those de-
veloped by other nations with private health insurance industries.
Chile has created its own devices, noted above, for bringing
transparency to the insurance market and for limiting the use by
insurers of certain contract clauses. Perhaps the most interesting
tool developed by the SISP, from a U.S. perspective, is its system for
hearing health insurance complaints. A central issue in our debate
about managed care has been the crafting of systems for handling
complaints and appeals. There is much to learn here from the
Chilean system.
Any insured who feels aggrieved by his or her insurer may com-
plain to the SISP. These complaints may be presented in writing,
by telephone, in person, or by email. 0 8 During 1997, the SISP re-
ceived 46,835 complaints and questions from consumers.2 09 The
consumer department of the Audit Division of the Superinten-
dency initially reviews these -complaints and questions.1 Many of
them are either not within the jurisdiction of the SISP (e.g., they
pertain to issues such as the level of insurance premiums, over
which the SISP has no jurisdiction, or sick leave denials, which are
the responsibility of another agency) or are easily-clarified misun-
derstandings. 1
Serious complaints are forwarded to the arbitration division of
the legal department.2 1 2 In 1997, 698 complaints were resolved by
the legal department.21 3 The complaints are first sent to the in-
surer, who has three business days (or up to five continuous days)
to provide the SISP with both its response to the complaint and
any relevant documentary evidence.1 The burden of proof in
complaint cases normally rests with the insurer, so insurers have
reason to respond promptly and thoroughly. Responding to
complaints is a major responsibility of the legal departments of in-
207. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 189.
208. See Interview with Fernando RiverosVidal, supra note 114.
209. See SISP, BOLETiN ESTADiSTICO, supra note 73, at 76.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, Director, Legal Department, SISP, in
Santiago, Chile (June 22, 1998) (on file with author); Interview with Andrea Mufioz
Sanchez, supra note 111.
213. See SISP, BOLETIN ESTADiSTICO, supra note 73, at 76.
214. See Interview with Anna Maria Rubio, General Counsel, Banm~dica, in Santiago,
Chile (June 24, 1998) (on file with author).
215. See Interview with Fernando Riveros Vidal, supra note 71.
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surers. 1 6 Once the SISP receives a complaint, it is assigned to an
attorney of the legal department of the SISP for investigation. 7 In
most instances evidence is taken in writing, except when necessary
witnesses are interviewed or examined.218 Each party may respond
to statements of the other party as long as either party has further
statements to make.2 9 The complaint and responses are then re-
viewed by the staff attorney assigned to the complaint, who
develops a written analysis of the case and recommended solu-
tion.2 2 0 The SISP has three full-time and one part-time physician on
staff who assist with medical questions raised by the complaints,
such as whether a medical condition preexisted the policy.22' Spe-
cialists may also be consulted if necessary.
222
Once the investigation process is complete, the complaint, re-
sponse, analysis, and recommendation are reviewed by a
committee consisting of the attorney who worked up the case, the
physician who assisted (if one did), the head of the legal depart-
ment, and representatives of the audit and research departments.121
This committee comes up with a proposed decision for the com-
plaint. The Superintendent ultimately reviews every complaint
personally and may either adopt the proposed resolution or craft
224his own response.
If the complaint is resolved against the insurer, the insurer must
comply with the resolution ordered by the SISP. In some cases, the
SISP issues small damage awards in the form of "interest" on the
insured. 25 In 1997, 698 cases were resolvedamount due the  . 19,68cse ersle
through the arbitration process.26 Twenty-five percent were won
216. The General Counsel of Banmtdica estimated that responding to complaints con-
sumed 80% of the time of her three lawyer legal staff. See Interview with Anna Maria Rubio,
supra note 214.
217. There are five attorneys assigned to this task within the SISP. See Interview with
Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
218. See id. This is particularly likely to occur where the complainant claims that the in-
surance salesman made oral misrepresentations. In these cases the salesperson may be
interviewed. If oral testimony is taken, the attorneys of the parties may cross-examine,
though usually only the insurer will have an attorney. If the salesperson denies the claims,
the claimant will usually lose, as the claimant must usually sign the policy application stating
that he has read and understood the policy and will be bound by this statement in the ab-
sence of admissions that representations contrary to the policy were made. See Interview with
Fernando Riveros Vidal, supra note 71.
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totally by the insured, 28% totally by the insurer, 34% partially by
the insured, and the remainder were subject to other disposi-
tions. 22' The insurer may contest the decision in court but must
essentially prove misconduct on the part of the SISP to prevail. 8
Decisions are in fact rarely appealed.2 2 The appellate decisions of
the SISP are published annually to inform insurers of the position
of the SISP on various issues. °
The arbitration process is quite time-consuming, lasting six
months or more.2 3' The process is, however, free to the insured and
is often the best means of resolving problems with insurers. Moreo-
ver, if the complaint is directed at termination of the insured, the• 1232
insurer must continue coverage until the complaint is resolved.
One of the most important characteristics of this process is that
in responding to complaints the SISP is not limited to the strict
letter of the statute, regulations, and contract, but has equitable
233powers to resolve complaints fairly. Under the law, for example,
there is nothing to forbid an insurer from raising the premiums of
a particular plan as long as the insurer does so equally for all per-
• 234
sons insured under the plan. As noted above, however, insurers
can escape this requirement by offering new plans to insureds with
favorable claims experience and then raising premiums dramati-
cally for persons insured under the plan with less favorable claims
experience who are left behind. Persons whose rates have thus
been dramatically increased may complain to the SISP. The SISPS23 
5
has been willing to consider the equity of these rate increases. In
a case where an insured is effectively a "captive" to the insurer be-
cause her medical condition makes her otherwise uninsurable, the
proposed rate increase is substantial, and the financial situation of
the insurer does not make an increase necessary, the SISP has been
willing to reject the increase and propose a reasonable price in-
236crease given the situation. In effect, the regulator has honored
227. See id.
228. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
229. See id.
230. See generally, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INSTITUCIONES DE SALUD PREVISIONAL, Bo-
LETiN DE FALLOS DE LA SISP, PERIODO: ENERO A DICIEMBRE DE 1996 (1997) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
231. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
232. See SISP, Regulation 2500, § 5.1 (on file with author).
233. See Interview with Andrea Muiloz Sanchez, supra note 212; Interview with Andrea
Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 111; Interview with Alejandro Ferreiro Yazigi, Superintendent,
SISP, in Santiago, Chile (June 15, 1998) (on file with author).
234. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 111.
235. See id.
236. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
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the "reasonable expectations" of insureds that they would not be
singled out for excessive premium increases, just as American
courts have often honored "reasonable expectations" to curb in-
surer overreaching. 37
The complaint procedure is not exclusive, and insureds may go
to court if they choose. 23 There is in fact an expedited judicial pro-
cedure in Chile for challenging violations of constitutional rights,
and insureds have used this procedure effectively to challenge in-
surance company actions that allegedly violate the constitutional
right to health care.3 9 Court proceedings are more costly, however,
because an attorney is required, and the vast majority of insureds
choose to bring their complaints to the SISP.
240
There is much to commend this model as a managed care com-
plaint procedure. Particular features of the procedure-the
placement of the burden of proof on the insurer, the use of an in-
terdisciplinary team to review complaints, the vesting ultimate
decisionmaking power in an official who is both politically ac-
countable and also responsible for assuring the solvency of
insurers, the availability of equitable power as well as legal, and the
publication of decisions for future consideration-all would be
useful in a managed care setting. These ideas should give us food
for thought as we craft our own procedures for regulating man-
aged care.
D. Rejlecting on Our Responsibility
In his recent movie of the same name, Michael Moore suggests
that the United States be renamed "The Big One, 24' reflecting our
position on the world stage. Though the overall situation of our
health care system-the highest health care costs in the world
combined with the lowest rate of insurance coverage of any devel-
oped nation-gives other nations little to envy, there is a great deal
of interest worldwide in our managed care developments. For bet-
ter or worse, a number of nations are developing various managed
237. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 103, 103-32 (1986) (discussing court decisions and rationales honoring an
insured's expectations).
238. See Interview with Anna Maria Rubio, supra note 214.
239. See id.; Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
240. See id.
241. THE BIG ONE (Miramax 1998).
SUMMER 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
care arrangements, often with assistance from United States com-
panies and individuals.
Because Chile has a well-developed private health insurance in-
dustry and a strong commitment to a free-market economy, and
because it is generally open to new ideas and institutions, it is pos-
sible that managed care will develop quickly in Chile. As noted
above, some ISAPREs have already begun to develop managed care
systems. We have discovered in the United States that institutions
that have been developed for regulating fee-for-service insurance
are not adequate for responding to the issues raised by managed
care. That is the reason for this symposium. In particular, a much
more sophisticated capacity for evaluating medical decisions of in-
surers is necessary when the main threat that an insurance
regulator must address is underservice.
At the time this Article was written, Chile was just beginning to
think about how to regulate managed care.2 4' Legislative and regu-
latory efforts at the federal and state level, as well as a torrent of
academic publications and conferences such as this symposium,
suggest that we are further along in working through this problem.
As we begin to solve this regulatory problem, we need to make our
solutions broadly available. We should find ways to involve entities
that work with health care systems throughout the world, such as
the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organi-
zation, or the World Bank, in these dissemination efforts.
CONCLUSION
The task of designing institutions and programs to regulate
managed care is essential, but formidable. Though comparative
law and policy studies may not be able to contribute much to this
task, they can contribute something. When tackling such a difficult
and important task, we need to accept help wherever we can find
it. The experience of other nations, such as Chile, can help us gain
perspective both on the context and the importance of our task,
and perhaps suggest tools that we can use to accomplish it.
242. See Interview with Andrea Mufioz Sanchez, supra note 212.
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